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The Pathways of Knowledge in Boiardo 
and Ariosto: The Case of Rodamonte 
"All men by nature desire to know." - Aristotle, Metaphysics 
How do we come to know? What can be known? How can true knowl- 
edge be distinguished from belief and opinion? What are the effects 
of knowledge? How does knowledge shape the course of our actions? 
These are some of the questions that philosophers were asking in fifteenth- 
and sixteenth-century Italy. The answers would have differed depending 
on whether one adhered to scholastic Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, 
"nature philosophies," or Skepticism, but all schools of thought were 
engaged in discussions about the nature of knowledge.1 Philosophers, 
moreover, were not the only ones interested in the process of knowledge 
acquisition and the relation of knowledge to action. In this essay I focus 
on how the poets Matteo Maria Boiardo and Lodovico Ariosto develop 
their thoughts on the subject in their romance epics, Orlando innamorato 
and Orlando furioso. My intention is not to fit them into any particular 
philosophical movement (although correspondences will be noted when 
relevant), but rather to show that both poets were deeply aware of the 
questions surrounding the issue of knowledge and that they provided 
their own answers through their fiction. 
Boiardo's Orlando innamorato presents a world in which characters are 
in dire need of greater knowledge about both themselves and the world 
around them, and assumes that such knowledge will lead to the better- 
ment of the self and of society at large. In the Orlando furioso, Ariosto chal- 
lenges Boiardo's optimistic faith in knowledge in two fundamental ways: 
first, he suggests that what is referred to as knowledge is often no more 
than unfounded belief bolstered by subjective emotional states; second, he 
shows that objective knowledge does not necessarily have positive conse- 
quences, but, on the contrary, can actually bring about the undoing of both 
the self and the social fabric. Boiardo had developed his conception of 
knowledge as the road to self-improvement most fully through the history 
of the Saracen Rodamonte. Ariosto uses the same character, renamed 
Rodomonte, transforming the knight's previously charted progress on the 
pathways of knowledge into an outright dead end. In both poems, the 
question "to know or not to know" is crucial because the stakes are so 
high. In essence, what you know determines how you act and therefore 
who you are. 
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The principal epic matter of the Orlando innamorato begins with the 
council of African kings in Biserta that opens Book 2. After King Agra- 
mante has announced his ambitious plan to invade France, the other 
kings respond. Branzardo, held to be the most prudent ("il piu pru- 
dente," 01 2.1.38) of all those gathered at Biserta, is the first to speak.2 
Turning a problem of action (whether or not to invade France) into a 
question of knowledge, he states that there are three ways to arrive at 
knowledge of all things - reason, example, and experience: 
Tutte le cose de che se ha scenza, 
O ver che son provate per ragione, 
O per esempio, o per esperienza. (OI 2.1.39) 
The statement takes on the aspect of a lesson when Branzardo goes on 
to illustrate each of these three ways in three distinct stanzas. His three 
pathways of knowledge, moreover, all lead to the same conclusion - that 
the proposed invasion of France would end in failure. King Sobrino next 
speaks up to support Branzardo's argument based on experience, since he 
has fought the same Christian knights during the invasion of France led 
by Agramante's grandfather ("io gli ho provati," OI 2.1.51).3 The fact that 
Boiardo singles out Branzardo as a figure of wisdom ("ha molto sapere," 
OI 2.1.44) suggests a close alliance between prudence and wisdom as the 
virtues that permit us to foresee the probable outcome of our actions and 
therefore help us to make the right choices.4 
Boiardo's fictional alliance between wisdom and prudence recalls the 
moral philosophy of Aristotle which, along with the writings of Cicero 
and Seneca, helped shape the idea of wisdom in fifteenth century civic 
humanism. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle related wisdom to pru- 
dence, which he defined as "something more than a knowledge of gener- 
al principles," to become rather "a matter of conduct" (180).5 In his study 
of the Renaissance idea of wisdom, Eugene Rice examines the humanists' 
understanding of wisdom as an active, not contemplative virtue, as an 
ethical precept rather than a body of knowledge (149). Regarding Coluccio 
Salutati, Rice remarks that "the only reason he does not say that prudence 
is nobler than wisdom is that he is prepared to take a further step and, by 
defining wisdom as moral philosophy, identify the two" (36).6 
The arrogant Rodamonte begins his refutation of the two previous 
interventions with recourse to a "truth" based on scientific observation: 
"In ciascun loco / Ove fiamma s'accende, un tempo dura / piccola prima, 
e poi si fa gran foco; / ma come viene al fin, sempre se oscura, / mancando 
del suo lume a poco a poco" (OI 2.1.53). This scientific fact is the basis of 
an analogy that describes human nature: "E cosi fa l'umana creatura, / 
che, poi che la di sua eth passato il verde, / la vista, il senno e Yanimo si 
perde" (OI2.1.53). Using facts about the world of nature in order to explain 
This content downloaded from 128.59.152.32 on Thu, 24 Apr 2014 10:44:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Pathways of Knowledge in Boiardo and Ariosto 
human behavior was common practice at least as far back as Aristotle, and 
was based on the understanding of correspondences between man (the 
microcosm) and the greater world around him (the macrocosm). The par- 
ticular example that Rodamonte provides, moreover, deals with the con- 
cepts of light and vision. He measures the flame by the light (lume) that it 
provides and by its darkening (se oscura). On the human front, the listing 
of sight (vista), sense/wisdom (senno) and courage/spirit (animo), suggests 
a chronological sequence: sight leads to knowledge which then governs 
action. The primacy of sight in Rodamonte'~s analogy continues as he 
applies his universal statement regarding humankind to the circum- 
stances at hand: "Questo ben chiar si vede nel presente / per questi duo 
che adesso hanno parlato" (012.1.54). Rodamonte is adept at applying sci- 
entific knowledge to human nature and at moving from the universal to 
the particular, and his emphasis on sight is a cue that for him the under- 
lying basis of all knowledge is sense-perception. Indeed, as I argue below, 
Rodamonte will later state that his own knowledge of the world is based 
on what he can see with his eyes. One could thus say that Rodamonte 
counters the moral philosophical tradition with scientific observation of 
natural phenomena and human nature, replacing "experience, example, 
and reason" with "sight" as the privileged mode of knowledge acquisi- 
tion. However, despite Rodamonte's recourse to the rigors of science, the 
limits of sense-perception for gaining knowledge were pointed out at least 
as far back as Plato's Theaetetus, in which Socrates criticized those "who 
believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will 
not allow that actions or generation or anything invisible can have real 
existence."7 
The King of Garamanta intervenes next to suggest another way of 
arriving at knowledge - divine revelation. A prophet of the Muslim 
divinity Apollino, the King of Garamanta is described as a "saggio [...] 
incantatore, astrologo e indovino" (OI 2.1.57). Whereas Branzardo and 
Sobrino sought knowledge through moral philosophy, and Rodamonte 
sought knowledge through earth science, the King of Garamanta seeks 
knowledge through metaphysics, and we are told that he spends his time 
counting the stars and measuring the heavens. Divine revelation leads 
him to the same conclusion that the other two kings had arrived at 
through prudence and wisdom, and he goes beyond their vision by 
adding a detail that the others could not have foreseen: "E Rodamonte con 
sua gran possanza / Diverra pasto de' corbi de Franza" (OI 2.1.59). If Roda- 
monte dismissed prudence and wisdom, one can well imagine how he 
responds to prophecy. He declares that he will be his own prophet in 
France ("io sero il profeta di quel loco," OI 2.1.61), thus asserting his 
unlimited faith in his ability to fashion his own destiny. 
Although the subject is ostensibly about a proposed war in France, the 
three-way discussion suggests a battle pitting prudence, wisdom, and 
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divine revelation against sensory perception. In addition, the kings' wider 
knowledge of the past, the world, and the heavens, is contrasted with 
Rodamonte's declared knowledge of his own strength. Their differing 
conceptions of knowledge acquisition lead them to make opposite assess- 
ments about the outcome of an African invasion of France: while the three 
kings predict disaster, Rodamonte expects victory. Boiardo had already 
indicated that Biserta would be destroyed in the upcoming war (2.1.19), 
thus confirming in advance that the kings were correct. 
One could also place these pathways of knowledge in a hierarchical 
relationship. Aristotle postulated that knowledge originates - but does 
not end - with sense-perception, and mainstream medieval and Renais- 
sance philosophers commonly reiterated that view. In his speculative works, 
the philosopher and theologian Nicholas Cusano (1401-1464) outlined a 
trajectory of knowledge acquisition which moved from sense-perception 
to the higher faculties of reason and intellect.8 Yet Cusano believed that 
even knowledge attained by discursive reason was no more than an 
approximation or a conjecture, and, especially in the quest to know God, 
the intellect needed to be supplemented with religious faith. In this con- 
text, one could say that Rodamonte is stuck on the first rung of the ladder 
of knowledge, while Branzardo, Sobrino and the King of Garamanta sym- 
bolize the successive stages. 
King Agramante, characterized by pride, arrogance, and ambition, 
intervenes to tell the gathering of kings that they must accompany him to 
France. He does not, however, rely excusively on sense-perception the 
way that Rodamonte does. When the King of Garamanta reveals that a 
young man who could bring down Charlemagne is hidden out of sight in 
the mountains, Agramante believes his words ("ben crede a sue parole") 
and decides to delay the invasion until the youth is found. Boiardo endorses 
Agramante's decision by confirming the King of Garamanta's past success: 
"E sempre nel passato avea veduto / 1n corso delle stelle tutte quante, / E 
sempre avanti il tempo predicia / Divizia, guerra, pace, carestia" (OI 2.1.76). 
Here the King of Garamanta is not only predicting the future (the outcome 
of the war), but he is also affirming the existence of something (or, in this 
case, someone) not yet verified by sensory perception. The search could 
thus be seen as a contest between the King of Garamanta's and Roda- 
monte's opposing theories of knowledge acquisition. 
The subsequent failure of the search for the youth, Rugiero, leads to a 
discussion that centers once again on the problem of knowledge. King 
Mulabuferso, sent to find Rugiero on Mount Carena, affirms and swears 
that Rugiero is not there simply because he has not seen him: 
Visto ho l'ultimo di quel che il primiero. 
Onde io te acerto e affermo in iuramento, 
Che 1h non se ritrova alcun Rugiero. (OI 2.3.18) 
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The first verse begins with what Mulabuferso has actually seen ("visto 
ho"), the second contains two verbs which confer the certainty of knowl- 
edge in a legal context ("acerto e affermo in iuramento"), while the third 
verse categorically states the absence of Rugiero. Following this parody of 
logical deduction, Mulabuferso states his belief that the Rugiero they are 
seeking never even existed: "Ne altro credo io che sia piu nato mai" (OI 
2.3.18). Mulabuferso's reasoning is quite simple, even if erroneous: since 
he, like Rodamonte, believes only what he sees, he assumes that whatever 
he does not see cannot exist. Rodamonte then turns Mulabuferso's state- 
ment of belief in the non-existence of Rugiero into a general maxim, cursing 
any man who believes what he has not seen: "Mal aggia l'omo che da tanta 
fede / Al ditto di altri e a quel che non si vede!" (OI 2.3.20). Continuing the 
link between sight, knowledge, and existence, Rodamonte then shifts from 
the dubious existence of Rugiero to that of the gods: "Se egli e alcun dio nel 
cel, ch'io nol so certo" (OI 2.3.22). Although Rodamonte expressly negates 
the possibility of knowing whether God exists or not ("io nol so certo"), he 
again assumes that sight is the only way to acquire such knowledge: "Omo 
non e che l'abbia visto esperto" (OI 2.3.22). He then goes on to conclude 
that belief in God is based on human emotion; in this case, fear: "Ma la vil 
gente crede per paura" (OI 2.3.22). 
Rodamonte's refusal to give credence to what another says ("al ditto di 
altri") leaves him with a view of the world limited to what he has seen 
with his own eyes. In the space of this restricted world, he has faith exclu- 
sively in his weapons and himself: 
Io de mia fede vi ragiono aperto 
Che solo il mio bon brando e l'armatura 
E la maza ch'io porto e '1 destrier mio 
E l'animo ch'io ho, sono il mio dio. (OI 2.3.22) 
This is not man fashioned in the image of God, but man as a god unto 
himself. He is the center of a universe that revolves around him. After 
hearing Rodamonte's reductionist view of reality, the King of Garamanta 
reaffirms his ability to discern and convey truth ("il vero"), a truth which 
for him includes the existence of God. He attributes Rodamonte's attitude 
precisely to a faulty manner of seeing, and his answer plays with the notion 
of sight: "Come vedeti, egli ha il viso perduto / Benche mai tutto non 
l'avesse intiero" (OI 2.3.25). As Bruscagli notes, il viso refers to la vista or, in 
this case, discernment, thus referring to Rodamonte's inability to see with 
the mind's eye (vol. 2: 574). At the same time, by prefacing his remark to 
Agramante with "come vedeti," the King of Garamanta calls on Agra- 
mante to share his mode of seeing in opposition to Rodamonte's impaired 
vision. Agramante once again sides with the King of Garamanta against 
Rodamonte, and decides to continue searching for Rugiero. Rodamonte, 
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by contrast, refuses to wait any longer and immediately crosses the sea to 
France. Although he considered himself his own god, he is powerless 
against the forces of fortune, and a storm at sea leads to the loss of two 
thirds of his men before he even steps ashore onto French territory. 
Once Rodamonte comes into contact with the world outside Africa, he 
begins to reassess his knowledge of his place in it.9 A preliminary step in 
Rodamonte's road to greater knowledge is his battle against Ranaldo. 
After experiencing first-hand Ranaldo's valor on the battlefield, Roda- 
monte declares that King Sobrino had indeed spoken the truth: "Come 
diceva il vero il re Sobrino!" (01 2.15.30). Rodamonte's "Io l'ho provato" 
(OI 2.15.29) is a direct echo of Sobrino's earlier "Io gli ho provati" (OI 
2.1.51). Rodamonte, in fact, is so impressed by the truth of Sobrino's state- 
ment that he goes from one extreme to the other - whereas before he said 
that one should never believe another's experience, now he decares that 
one should always believe it: "Sempre creder si debbe a chi ha provato" 
(OI 2.15.30). As Rodamonte accepts this new way of learning about the 
world around him, he can also more accurately see himself in relation to 
others. His encounter with Ranaldo thus leads him to correct his percep- 
tion of himself: "Io, che tutti pigliarli avea arroganza, / Assai ne ho de uno, 
e piu che di bastanza" (01 2.15.30). 
The full transformation of Rodamonte's character comes about when he 
confronts Rugiero. Although Rodamonte does not find out his opponent's 
identity, Rugiero will change his way of seeing and his way of acting. First, 
Rugiero courteously takes the Christian Bradamante's place against Roda- 
monte when his fellow Saracen refuses to give her leave to follow the 
retreating Charlemagne. Then, when in the course of their battle Roda- 
monte loses his sword, Rugiero courteously waits for him to retrieve it 
rather than take advantage of the situation. Significantly, Rodamonte 
expresses his new evaluation of his opponent in terms of seeing: "Ben chia- 
ramente aggio veduto / Che cavallier non e di te migliore" (OI 3.5.12). 
Ironically it is Rugiero, whose existence he doubted and whose impor- 
tance to the invasion he dismissed, who provides Rodamonte with greater 
knowledge of the world and of his (smaller) place in it. It is this knowledge 
that leads Rodamonte to humble himself and declare unconditional obe- 
dience to Rugiero: "E sempre, quanto io possa e quanto io vaglia, / Di me 
fa il tuo parere in ogni banda, / Come il maggiore al suo minor comanda" 
(OI 3.5.13). These declarations of Rugiero's excellence and his own attitude 
of subservience show how his increased knowledge of the world is linked 
to a new way of acting. Rodamonte still thinks in extremes: the best knight 
he has encountered becomes the best knight tout court, and his readiness to 
obey is expressed with the absolutes "in ogni banda" and "sermpre." Perhaps 
this tendency to drastic shifts in thinking, also reflected in his reassess- 
ment of Sobrino's warning in light of his encounter with Ranaldo, charac- 
terizes Rodamonte as someone who is just beginning to learn to think dif- 
ferently and therefore lacks subtleties. At the same time, however, Boiardo 
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makes dear that Rodamonte's new estimation, while extreme, is absolutely 
correct. The very first verse Boiardo wrote of Rugiero had said as much: "fu 
d'ogni virtute il pii perfetto / Di qualunque altro che al mondo si vanta" 
(OI 1.29.56). Rodamonte's total reversal in thinking is accompanied by an 
equally complete turnabout in his behavior: his arrogance has been trans- 
formed into humility. Rodamonte's itinerary of self-knowledge can be 
understood as a paideia, an education of the soul.l0 Although the poem is 
interrupted before Rodamonte encounters Rugiero again and can act on 
his declared intentions, one could expect that the future relation between 
the two knights would have continued to attest to the positive effects of 
both Rugiero's courtesy and Rodamonte's greater self-knowledge. Charles 
Ross has argued that John Milton saw Rugiero as a Christ figure (385). 
Perhaps Rodamonte's meeting with Rugiero suggests something to that 
effect as well; whereas his battle against Ranaldo confirmed the rational 
teaching of Branzardo and Sobrino, his encounter with Rugiero harkens 
back to the supranatural knowledge of the King of Garamanta. 
Ariosto's treatment of Rodomonte completely reverses the problem as 
presented by Boiardo with regards to both the acquisition of knowledge 
and the relation of knowledge to action. Whereas at his first appearance in 
the Innamorato Rodamonte did not believe anything he could not see 
with his own eyes, in the Furioso Rodomonte becomes the very picture of 
credulity. Moreover, whereas Boiardo's character would eventually profit 
morally when confionted by a reality that disproved his views and deflated 
his ego, in the Furioso, knowledge proves to be the corresponding character's 
undoing. Rodomonte's first error is to believe that Doralice will remain 
enamored of him while he spends all his time away at war. Rodomonte 
finds his assumption to have been misguided when Doralice chooses 
Mandricardo ver him as her beloved. Crushed by this unwelcome reality, 
Rodomonte continues to think in absolutes and declares that all women 
are false and fickle. While this is presented as a case of disbelief (that is, he 
doubts the sincerity and fidelity of any woman), it is actually a case of pro- 
claiming to have knowledge about all women without verifying his hypoth- 
esis. A single instance is sufficient o convince him that female fraud is infi- 
nite ("che de l'ascose / feminil frode sia copia infinita"). His reasoning ("or 
ragionando"), as the narrator comments, is without reason ("da ragion si 
dipartiva," 27.122; "di ragion passava il segno," 27.125). 
At the council in Biserta in Innamorato 2.1, Branzardo had outlined the 
procedure of arriving at knowledge through reason, experience, and 
example. The experience and "reasoning" that has led to Rodomonte's 
erroneous view of women will soon find corraboration in the example of 
others. After abandoning Agramante, Rodamonte stops at an inn where 
the owner relates a misogynist tale about unfaithful women. The story of 
Giocondo and King Astolfo, which tells of the infidelity of every woman 
the two men encounter, is said to be one of the stories told to the innkeeper 
by Gian Francesco Valerio, an actual historical figure, who himself had 
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knowledge ("sapea") of female fraud through both example and experi- 
ence ("modeme istorie e antiche, / e proprie esperienze," OF 27.138). The 
innkeeper charges those who do not share his view to be "senza ragione" 
(OF 27.137) and contrasts his knowledge ("io so") with their "falsa opi- 
nione" (OF 27.135). Rodomonte believes the stories because they corre- 
spond to his emotion of anger after his "beloved" Doralice publicly declares 
her preference for Mandricardo. As he says to the innkeeper: "Che puoi tu 
farmi, / che piii al presente mi diletti e piaccia, / che dirmi istoria e qualche 
esempio darmi / che con l'opinion mia si confaccia?" (OF 27.140). Rodo- 
monte had arrived at the inn imitating the wandering of the unrequited 
Petrarchan lover ("Di pensiero in pensiero ando vagando," OF 27.133), but 
he seems unaware of Petrarch's warning against judgments based on 
emotion: "Nothing is easier than to persuade people who want to be per- 
suaded and already believe" (73). The same warning, however, is voiced 
by an elderly man at the inn who, stating that we hear many things that 
are not true ("assai cose udimo dire / che veritade in se non hanno alcuna," 
OF 28.76), maintains that anger ("ira," OF 28.78) had motivated Valerio, 
whose tales were based more on "opinione" than on "esperienza" (OF 
28.77). Ariosto tells us that this honest and just old man had "piiu retta / 
opinion degli altri" (OF 28.76), an expression that on the one hand acknowl- 
edges all general views to be opinion without reaching the status of true 
knowledge, and on the other recognizes that some views are decidedly 
more correct than others. Following the old man's reasoning ("appresso 
alle ragioni," OF 28.84), he wants to provide examples to support his argu- 
ment, thus reminding the reader that reason, experience, and example 
may support two contradictory truths and thus are no simple guarantee 
of trustworthiness. Rodomonte, however, refuses to even listen to exam- 
ples that do not correspond to his own feelings. He is not interested in 
learning the truth or in acquiring greater knowledge, but only in hearing 
what will confirm the view he already holds. The problem that Ariosto is 
outlining here is the intrusive role of the emotions that prevents him from 
seeking the truth ("fuggia udire il vero," OF 28.84). Emotions prevent 
Rodomonte from gathering additional information that could lead to a 
more balanced judgment. Knowledge for Valerio, the innkeeper, and Rodo- 
monte has thus been reduced to emotion-based opinion. Experience and 
example, in this Furioso episode, do not lead to greater knowledge, but 
only serve to support false beliefs. 
Rodomonte's "knowledge" that all women are unfaithful is eventually 
belied by a new experience. When Rodomonte meets Isabella and wants 
to win her love, he shows his own fickleness by forgetting his previous 
disdain for women. Ariosto focuses on the problem of knowledge and 
truth throughout this episode. When Rodomonte hurls the hermit accom- 
panying the bereaved Isabella into the air, the narrator caims not to know 
what became of him ("Che n'avenisse, ne dico ne sollo"). He then goes on 
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to tell three different versions of the hermit's fall, concluding: "Di queste, 
qual si vuol, la vera sia: / di lui non parla pii l'istoria mia" (OF 29.7). By 
following an acknowledgment of the narrator's limited knowledge with a 
proliferation of possible stories, Ariosto suggests the human propensity to 
substitute knowledge with imagination, leading the reader to doubt the 
veracity of any history. 
Rodomonte's next error combines unfounded belief with the need to 
verify "truth" through tangible evidence. Isabella tells Rodomonte about 
a magic potion that will make him invulnerable. Paradoxically, however, 
the proof of the potion's efficiency already presupposes belief in magic, 
since it requires taking an axe to Isabella's neck. Her explanation to 
Rodomonte focuses specifically on knowledge and belief: 
Acci6 che paia 
che mie parole al vento non ho mosse, 
quella che '1 ver da la bugia dispaia, 
e che pu6 dotte far le genti grosse, 
te ne far6 l'esperienza ancora, 
non ne l'altrui, ma nel mio corpo or ora. (OF 29.23) 
Whereas in Innamorato 2.1 Boiardo's Rodamonte had chided the "vil 
gente" for believing in God out of fear, now Ariosto's Rodomonte is dis- 
posed to believe in magic out of a desire for invulnerability. This is in a 
sense a desire to return to the early Rodamonte's original state of mind 
when he had declared himself his own god. If we recall that at the time 
Rodamonte had stated he would only believe what was before his eyes, 
the full irony of the situation can be appreciated: he will believe in magic 
if he can see it, but he essentially needs to believe in it in order to go 
through with the test. Ariosto not only criticizes Rodomonte's foolishness 
here, but in the following canto he derides all those who believe only what 
they see in front of their eyes: "La sciocca turba [...] non mira piui lungi ne 
comprende di quel ch'inanzi agli occhi si ritrova" (OF 30.27). 
When Rodomonte, in a drunken state, unwittingly beheads Isabella, 
his error is precisely that of credulity. He had put his faith erroneously both 
in her words and in the promise of magic to overcome the most obvious 
natural phenomena. When Ariosto mockingly says "Quel uom bestial le 
presto fede" (OF 29.25), he is pointing to the irrational nature of Rodo- 
monte's belief.11 With Isabella's death, once again Rodomonte's assump- 
tions are shattered by an unwelcome reality. His response, as before, is 
irrational and destructive: he creates a tomb for Isabella and fights to the 
death all those who pass by. 
Ariosto's reversal of Rodomonte's progression on the path to knowl- 
edge extends to his relation to Ruggiero. In canto 23, Rodomonte encoun- 
tered Ippalca and wanted to take her horse. Upon hearing that the horse 
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belonged to Ruggiero, he considered this all the more reason for seizing it: 
"Adunque il destrier voglio, / poi ch'a Ruggier, si gran campion, lo toglio" 
(OF 23.35). Rodomonte thus ironically offends the knight to whom, at the 
end of the Innamorato, Rodamonte had declared unconditional obedience. 
The battle between Rodomonte and Ruggiero that takes place in the 
final canto of the Furioso reverses their earlier battle in the Innamorato. Here 
we find not the Rodamonte (of OI 3.5) who confesses his inferiority to the 
courteous Rugiero, but the Rodamonte (of OI 2.1) who wanted to live and 
die as a god unto himself. When Rodomonte continues to assault 
Ruggiero even though his opponent has momentarily lost consciousness 
(OF 46.124), he thereby refuses to show the same courtesy that Rugiero 
had extended to Rodamonte in the earlier poem. The ending of the Furioso 
is followed by the saying: "Pro bono malum." Although the meaning is 
generally attributed (with good reason) to Ariosto's relation to the poem's 
dedicatee Ippolito d'Este and to court life in general, the phrase also fits 
Rodomonte's reversal of the earlier Rugiero's courtesy (OI 3.5). 
When Rodomonte dies before the crowd gathered in Paris, he fulfills 
the King of Garamanta's prophecy of his death in France (OI 2.1.59) that 
was left unfulfilled in Boiardo's poem. Ariosto shows, moreover, that the 
King of Garamanta was justified in believing in what he could not see: the 
last "image" of Rodomonte in the poem is that of his invisible soul, now 
separated from its former material body, reaching the shores of Acheronte. 
If one asks what Rodomonte learned in the course of Ariosto's poem, 
the answer is bleak The experience of Doralice's abandonment led him to 
a false assumption about all women. The innkeeper's novellistic example 
only confirmed his negative opinion of women, which he mistook for 
"knowledge" but which was actually an unverified belief based on emo- 
tion. The direct experience of Isabella's faithfulness showed him the inad- 
equacy of his vision, but his reaction to this new knowledge made him act 
less, not more, human. Thus, neither example nor experience nor his par- 
ticular brand of reasoning led to an enlightened state of mind or to just 
actions. The truth did not set him free - it did not even make him wise 
but rather drove him to an extreme state of mind in which he acted irra- 
tionally. Rodamonte's initial road to knowledge finally came up against 
the dead end of death. 
This reversal of Rodamonte's moral itinerary is not so much a deflation 
of his character per se as a questioning of the concept of knowledge. Ariosto 
casts doubt on both the possibility of acquiring knowledge and the posi- 
tive nature of the outcome once true knowledge is acquired. A similar pat- 
tern emerges in Ariosto's treatment of the paladins Orlando and Rinaldo. 
Boiardo's Orlando needed to break out of a false illusion in order to regain 
his knightly identity. He left Charlemagne's court and headed east in search 
of a Saracen princess who originally planned to kill the paladins and who 
did not love him. He failed to comprehend Angelica as she was, and he 
transformed her into a creature of his imagination. Boiardo places various 
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figures before him to give him greater knowledge of his error: Dragontina 
and her frescoed cycle of Circe and Ulysses, the perfidious Origille, the 
female monsters in Falerina's garden, Narcissus, and the naiads at the 
Laughing Stream. If Orlando would only understand that these figures, 
like Angelica, are false illusions, then his greater knowledge would have a 
positive effect on his being and his actions. 
Only in the poem's final episode is there any indication of increased 
knowledge on Orlando's part. When he is freed from the enchantment of 
the Laughing Stream thanks to the knowledge (wisdom and prudence) of 
Fiordelisa, and the virtuous action of Brandimarte, a dwarf appears and asks 
the knights to accompany him on a new adventure. Orlando seems to have 
finally learned his lesson and he shows a new attitude of prudence. After 
comparing himself to a bird that has been freed from one trap and fears 
another, Orlando proclaims his long overdue awareness of deceptive illu- 
sion: "Ed io gabbato fui cotanto spesso, / Che, non che altrui, ma non credo 
a me stesso" (OI 3.7.39). He therefore does not follow the dwarf, and he 
heads instead to Paris to aid Charlemagne. 
Whereas Boiardo suggested that the wayward paladin could recover 
his senses by breaking through illusion, Ariosto counters this vision by 
showing that it is Orlando's knowledge of Angelica's true self that finally 
makes him go mad. Critics have been correct in pointing out that Orlando's 
madness comes through reading, but the full impact of the gesture hits 
home only when we see this as the culmination of a series of failed read- 
ings going back to the early cantos of the Innamorato.12 Boiardo's Orlando 
never made the link between Angelica and the enchantress Circe (Dragon- 
tina's loggia) or the allegorical female monsters (Falerina's garden). Ariosto 
dispenses with the analogies and allegories and supplies Orlando directly 
with autobiographical and biographical, written and verbal narratives fea- 
turing Angelica herself as the main character. The stories are not didactic, 
but simply informative. The illusion of Angelica that Orlando had created in 
his mind is finally shattered through the reality of Angelica as an autonomous 
desiring subject. The result, however, is not a realignment of the faculties 
of the soul under the control of intellect and reason, but the outright dis- 
integration of the self. As Ascoli aptly puts it: "not only is truth in crisis, 
truth is a crisis in itself" (326).13 Orlando's pazzia has been treated at too much 
length to be rehearsed again; my point here is that Ariosto turns Orlando 
into another example of the dangers of knowledge. Thus, the idea of an 
intimate tie between objective knowledge and responsible action - an 
idea anchored in the moral philosophy that Boiardo shared with the 
humanists - is no longer operative. 
*>(** 
While in the Innamorato Rodamonte and Orlando stumbled forward on 
a path toward greater knowledge and virtuous action, Ranaldo, with the 
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help of Merlin's fountain, already exemplified the humanist teaching on 
moral philosophy. Ranaldo was presented with narratives that explained 
how a situation of injustice was created, and his knowledge of events 
allowed him to act virtuously to bring about a just resolution. Knowledge 
was translated into ethical action as Ranaldo: 1) heard a story explaining 
the system of organized murder at Castle Cruel and then wiped out the 
evil custom, 2) read the story of the murder of Albarosa and then punished 
the guilty Truffaldino, and 3) heard about the rivalry turned friendship of 
Prasildo and Iroldo and then saved those knights from imminent death. 
Ranaldo thus lives out the moral philosophy which inextricably links 
knowledge, virtue, and action. 
Ariosto initially places his Rinaldo in this same role in the Ginevra 
episode, but later in the poem he uses him as a reader to present a very 
different view of knowledge and its uses. Rinaldo hears two novellas 
while traveling along the Po river valley on his way toward Lipadusa. 
Like the reference to the historical figure Valerio in Rodomonte's episode 
of the inn, here too historical reality mixes with the poem's fiction as 
Rinaldo passes right through Estense territory. This lack of clear demar- 
cation between the fictional and the factual brings these episodes a little 
closer to the real-life situation of the reader. 
In the context of the first novella, Rinaldo is given the chance to gain 
knowledge about his wife's chastity or infidelity by drinking from a magic 
chalice.14 His host vividly underlines the separation between knowledge 
and belief in the following two verses: " Se vuoi saper se la tua sia pudica / 
(come io credo che credi, e creder d6i)" (OF 42.102). Rinaldo, however, 
realizes that this knowledge can be dangerous: "quanto fosse periglioso il 
caso / a porvi i labri, col pensier discorse" (OF 42.104). He therefore refuses 
to drink from the chalice, preferring "belief" over certain knowledge of his 
wife's chastity. Rinaldo states his reply in terms of accepting human limi- 
tations: "Non so s'in questo io mi sia saggio o stolto / ma non vo' piii 
saper, che mi convegna" (OF 43.7). Further expanding his reasoning, he 
has recourse to no less than the tree of knowledge in Genesis: "che tal cer- 
tezza ha Dio piu proibita / ch'al primo padre l'arbor de la vita" (OF 43.7). 
Knowledge is thus equated with transgression. Rinaldo's new aversion to 
knowledge thus leads him to equate willful ignorance of his wife's possible 
infidelity with the bliss of the garden of Eden, as though dosing his eyes to 
reality could allow him to create his own terrestrial paradise.15 Indeed, 
rather than "love of wisdom," Rinaldo is advocating a "love of ignorance," 
and thereby preserving his own mental well-being. 
The novellistic "example" about adultery that follows the proposed 
test seems to confirm the sagacity of Rinaldo's refusal, since the moral 
that Rinaldo draws from it is the inevitability of corruption and thus 
the need to avoid putting one's virtue to the test. The host tells how he 
had actually led his wife to adultery by testing her virtue. Rinaldo's 
response to the story is to question the host's own steadfastness: "Se te 
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altretanto avesse ella tentato, / non so se tu pii saldo fossi stato" (OF 
43.49). 
The second story told to Rinaldo on his journey is pointedly referred to 
an esempio (OF 43.70), thus recalling the novella's didactic potential. A 
boatman tells of a woman who is accused by her husband of having been 
seduced by the allure of riches and who gets the upper hand when her 
husband falls into an even more repugnant state by allowing himself to be 
sodomized by a grotesque brute. Unlike the earlier Ginevra episode, here 
everyone is guilty. This example presents a picture of a fallen humanity 
with no hope of redemption and no possibility for the reader to intervene to 
bring about justice. Indeed, Rinaldo, laughing at the story, limits himself to 
praising the wife and blushing for the husband (OF 43.144). Ronald 
Martinez notes "the emphasis throughout the whole episode on con- 
sciousness of faults in the self" as he argues for "the morally therapeutic 
dimensions of Rinaldo's journey" (25, 30).16 I would propose instead that 
this increased consciousness of faults reveals the author's profound cyni- 
cism regarding human nature without offering any hope for improve- 
ment. Rinaldo's praise of Argia ("Rinaldo Argia molto lod6," OF 43.144) 
for throwing her husband into a lower moral ditch than the one into which 
she herself had fallen is a far cry from Ranaldo's expression of praise for 
Iroldo and Prasildo's reciprocal benevolent actions and his desire to risk his 
life to participate in their ideal friendship. The moral virtues sustaining 
Boiardo's poem have been completely redefined. Prudence, as the Po jour- 
ney's first novella and surrounding narrative context show, no longer 
means acting according to the dictates of reason, but rather choosing a 
veneer of false seeming over an unpleasant truth. Wisdom, in the second 
novella, has lost its ethical purpose and has been turned into the clever- 
ness of a wife setting a trap for her husband. Finally, justice no longer 
entails combatting evil, but simply proving to our neighbor (or spouse!) 
that he is more degenerate than we are. 
The reversal in Rinaldo's attitude from civic-minded engagement to a 
cynical passivity nullifies his role as a reader who interprets a story and 
then acts on his knowledge. On the contrary, the idea of bringing about a 
change for the better in a morally corrupt universe motivated solely by 
self-interest seems hardly a viable one, and we are at a loss to find an alter- 
native response to Rinaldo's bemused cynicism. 
If Ariosto's Orlando provides a negative parallel to Rodomonte, since 
each is devastated by unwelcome knowledge about his "beloved," in the 
concluding cantos Rinaldo comes to function as a positive contrast o both, 
albeit in an insidiously ironic way. He knows ahead of time that knowl- 
edge can make one insane, and he prefers to live with illusion. In Ariosto's 
fictional world not only does false opinion masquerade as knowledge, but 
even in cases in which objective knowledge is possible, it is not necessarily 
desirable. The world is so corrupt, and human nature responds so destruc- 
tively to unpleasant realities, that it is sometimes better not to know the 
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truth at all. Reflecting Ariosto's own personal situation and the general 
state of affairs in the Italian peninsula in the early sixteenth century, the 
Furioso's treatment of Rodomonte, together with that of Orlando and 
Rinaldo, breaks the Innamorato's link between knowledge and ethical 
action and offers little hope to its readers for a better future. 
JO ANN CAVALLO 
Columbia University 
NOTES 
1For a concise and useful overview of Renaissance theories of knowledge, see 
Popkin. Cassirer, Copleston, and Kristeller offer diverse accounts of Renaissance philos- 
ophy that nevertheless frequently address questions of knowledge. 
2I cite from Bruscagli's widely available paperback edition of the poem, but I also 
consulted Tissoni Benvenuti and Montagnani's recent critical edition. While the language 
of the critical edition is more archaic, there were no differences of a semantic nature for 
any of the passages cited in this essay. 
3As Murrin has noted, the failure of Agramante's invasion will confirm the validity 
of Sobrino's analysis (110). 
4Boiardo's understanding of a close link between wisdom and prudence comes 
through in his translation of Herodotus in which he interchanges the terms, translating 
"vir sapiens" as "uno omo di estimata prudentia," thus conveying more forcefully the 
idea of knowledge related to correct action (24r). 
5For the discussion of prudence and wisdom, see page 190. 
6Rice warns that these ideas are not widespread in fifteenth-century Italy (49). How- 
ever, they would have been available to the Ferrarese court since the time of Guarino da 
Verona, and Boiardo's poem as a whole is indebted to the moral philosophy of civic 
humanism. See Cavallo and Cossutta. 
7The Project Gutenberg Etext of Theaetetus, trans. Benjamin Jowett. 
8This trajectory of knowledge is first explored in Nicholas of Cusa, De docta igno- 
rantia (On Learned Ignorance, 1440), available in translation as Of Learned Ignorance: 
A Translation and Appraisal of the De Docta Ignorantia, and later developed in his other 
speculative works, especially De coniecturis (On Conjectures, c. 1443), Apologia doctae 
ignorantiae (Apology ofLearned Ignorance, 1449), and De visione dei (On the Vision of 
God, 1453). 
9Alexandre-Gras notes Rodamonte's positive transformation, although she does not 
discuss it in terms of knowledge but links it instead to the general civilizing process that 
Boiardo's pagan knights undergo in the course of the poem. 
0I am using the term as outlined by Jaeger. 
11Although Benson develops her argument along different lines, her following com- 
ment regarding Rodomonte is a propos here: "Experience corrects his opinion of women 
and leads him to appreciate the truth of the old man's concept" (107). See also Weaver 
396-98. 
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12Arguing that Ariosto's poem demonstrates the dangers of knowledge, especially in 
the area of love, Weaver writes: "Orlando e un lettore preparato, sa leggere bene, perfi- 
no l'arabo, e per aver saputo troppo, anche se involontariamente, e distrutto" (395). 
13For a different take on the problem of knowledge and ignorance in the Furioso, see 
Ascoli 321-31. 
14For a close reading of this episode see Santoro who, however, reads Rinaldo's 
refusal to drink as a warning of the limits of the possibility of knowledge in the face of 
an ever-changing reality (16). See also Martinez (25), Sherberg (43-89), and Weaver 
(400) who reads Rinaldo's refusal to know too much about his spouse as a counter- 
example to the pazzia that Orlando and Rodomonte undergo upon learning an unpleasant 
truth about their beloved. 
15Benson writes: "Rinaldo develops the analogy to draw a parallel between the con- 
sequences of knowledge in Adam's case and in the case of the inquiring husband and 
reveals the misogynist audacity of his analogy and the particular limits of his own phi- 
losophy." She continues: "He suggests that, in both the case of the apple and of the wife, 
God forbade knowledge to man because it would bring man unhappiness" (112). 
16Martinez reads Rinaldo's story (from the stream of disamore to Anselmo's tale) as 
a process of "reeducation" after he falls in love with Angelica (25). By comparing Rinaldo's 
new attitude to his role as a civic-minded reader before his enamorment, I view the events 
as part of a more negative process. 
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